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and the Problem of Coerced Preferences
Louis Michael Seidman*
Rubashov was silent. Quite a long time passed. Ivanov's head bent
even closer over the writing desk.
"I don't understand you," he said. "Half an hour ago you made
me a speech full of the most impassioned attacks against our policy,
any fraction of which would have been enough to finish you off. And
now you deny such a simple logical deduction as that you belonged
to an oppositional group, for which, in any case, we hold all the
proofs."
"Really?" said Rubashov. "If you have all the proofs, why do you
need my confession?"'
The fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause is a puzzle. Its defend-
ers hail it as "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make him-
self civilized." 2 This is so because "[t]he essential and inherent cruelty of
compelling a man to expose his own guilt is obvious to every one, and
* I would like to thank Al Alschuler, Timothy Brennan, Steve Goldberg, Tom Krattenmaker,
Steve Schulhofer, Gerry Spann, Richard Timbie, and Mark Tushnet for helpful comments on a pre-
vious draft of this article. I am also grateful to participants at the Georgetown University Law Center
Law and Economics Workshop and the University of Chicago Law School Criminal Justice Work-
shop for two difficult afternoons that ended up revealing serious deficiencies in my previous draft.
Finally, I could not have completed this article without the patient, cheerful, and meticulous research
assistance provided by Barry Pollack.
1. A. Koestler, Darkness at Noon 73 (1941).
2. E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 7 (1955).
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needs no illustration. It is plain to every person who gives the subject a
moment's thought." 3 Yet apparently civilized lawyers who seem to have
thought about the matter for more than a moment-Jeremy Bentham,4
Benjamin Cardozo, and Henry Friendly6 come to mind-have concluded
that the privilege is an unnecessary and anachronistic impediment to the
efficient discovery of truth in criminal prosecutions.7
These conflicting intuitions about the privilege present a familiar di-
lemma for constitutional law. Liberal theories of constitutionalism rest on
our ability to articulate noncontroversial "neutral" standards of substan-
tive political morality-standards abstracted from day-to-day political
controversy-against which political outcomes can be measured. The exis-
tence of such standards is what justifies constitutionalism-what makes it
an exercise in law, rather than power. But the effort to find and defend
yardsticks has proved strikingly unsuccessful. Intuitions specific enough to
resolve controversial questions of political morality are, themselves, gener-
ally controversial enough to make the claim of neutrality implausible.
Conversely, intuitions that are truly abstracted from political controversy
are, for that reason, likely to be too vague to resolve such controversy.8
This difficulty in justifying substantive, nonconsequentialist inhibitions
on the use of government power has driven many constitutional theorists
to process-based or consequentialist approaches. These approaches treat
the legitimacy of ends as exogenous to the analysis and focus on suppos-
edly less controversial questions about the process by which ends are de-
termined and the means by which ends are achieved.'
In this essay, I explore both the promise and the limits of this approach
3. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J. dissenting).
4. 5 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 207-83 (1827).
5. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) ("[Tlhere are students of our penal system
who look upon the [privilege] as a mischief rather than a benefit, and who would limit its scope, or
destroy it altogether. No doubt there would remain the need to give protection against torture, physi-
cal or mental. . . . Justice, however, would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to re-
spond to orderly inquiry").
6. See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 671 (1968).
7. Justice Stevens has written that "the roster of scholars and judges with reservations about
expanding the Fifth Amendment privilege reads like an honor roll of the legal profession." Lakeside
v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 n.5 (dissenting opinion). He cites works by Wigmore, Corwin, Pound,
Friendly, Schaefer, and Traynor.
For a recent, comprehensive attack on the various rationales for the privilege see Dolinko, Is There
a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1063 (1986). The
privilege leads not only to the acquittal of defendants who are guilty, but also to the conviction of
defendants who are innocent. For a discussion, see Tague, The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the
Guilty Defendant, an Impediment to the Innocent One, 78 Geo. L.J. 1 (1989).
8. The point is a familiar one. For important elaborations on it, see Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale
L.J. 1063, 1084-89 (1981); Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1371-82 (1984).
9. The best known efforts along this line are J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980) and H. Hart
& A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making And Application of Law (tent. ed.
1958). For a recent discussion of the sources of such efforts, see Peller, Neutral Principles in the
1950's, 21 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 561 (1988).
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to constitutionalism in the context of the fifth amendment privilege."
Parts One and Two are about the promise. I argue that the privilege can
be defended by reversing the usual assumption that it is rooted in deonto-
logical theory and that objections to it are consequentialist in character.
On the contrary, I argue that the privilege guarantees that government
coercion will be utilized only when it is a rational means rather than an
end in itself. 1 More specifically, the privilege prevents the imposition of
excessive punishment caused by the failure to incorporate the full cost of
such punishment into the cost/benefit equation.
My argument for this proposition rests on the ambiguous relationship
between coercion and truth. In order to understand that relationship, it is
useful to distinguish between the truth of statements concerning internal
hopes, desires, and beliefs and the truth of statements concerning external
facts about the world. Coercion, I argue, is a rational strategy for generat-
ing the second sort of statement but not the first. When coercion is utilized
to secure statements concerning internal mental states, it serves the inter-
ests of legitimation rather than of truth. The privilege, then, can be un-
derstood as a prophylactic rule designed to protect against the legitimation
of excessive punishment-legitimation produced by the illusion that the
defendant himself desires or accepts the punishment.
Part Three of this paper explores the limits of this sort of analysis. I
argue that a consequentialist defense of the fifth amendment must be pre-
mised on a radically individualistic theory about preferences. But this the-
ory is controversial. If we instead suppose that preferences are socially
constructed, the distinction between internal hopes and desires and exter-
nal facts in the world becomes much more difficult to maintain.
In fact, the law of self-incrimination is premised on contradictory views
about the social nature of preferences-views that reflect an underlying
antinomy in general constitutional theory. It is our inability to resolve this
contradiction that ultimately makes discussion of the fifth amendment con-
fused and unsatisfying.
10. I therefore do not address various nonconsequentialist justifications for the fifth amendment
privilege. For two especially illuminating examples of such defenses, see Greenawalt, Silence as a
Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 15 (1981) and Gerstein, Privacy and
Self-Incrimination, 80 Ethics 87 (1970). There is a sense in which those portions of this essay focus-
sing on the problems posed by consequentialist defenses can be read as support for nonconsequentialist
justifications. For my views on some of the difficulties posed by nonconsequentialist constitutional
argument, see Wasserstrom & Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo.
L.J. 19, 59-67 (1988).
11. For an important effort to justify the fifth amendment that utilizes a similar perspective, but
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I. CONSENT AND "CONSENT": THE PROBLEM OF COERCION AND
TRUTH
Defenders of the privilege have occasionally argued that there is a nec-
essary inconsistency between the use of compelled testimony on the one
hand and the search for truth on the other. They have maintained that the
mere fact of compulsion tends to impeach the reliability of any statement
made under the influence of that compulsion.12
In recent years this explanation for the fifth amendment privilege has
fallen into disfavor, and for good reason." In part, the explanation seems
to be premised on a confusion between coercing a person to speak and
coercing him to speak certain words. We might distrust the testimony of
someone who is told that he will be punished more severely unless he
confesses to a crime. But there is not a similar reason to distrust the con-
fession of someone who is simply compelled to tell what he knows. The
assertion that coerced statements of this sort are inherently untrustworthy
is strikingly implausible in light of our regular reliance on such state-
ments in contexts where they are not incriminating.
Moreover, even in situations where a defendant is not just compelled to
speak but also told what to say, there is no necessary reason why the
compelled statements should be treated as unreliable. A truth-based theory
of the fifth amendment fails to account for our refusal to admit coerced
statements into evidence when there are indicia of reliability, such as
when a coerced defendant reveals knowledge that only the perpetrator of
the offense could have had.14
There is a special category of cases, however, where it may seem that a
logical or necessary inconsistency exists between the truth of a statement
and the fact that the statement was coerced. In cases where we are inter-
ested in a person's internal preferences and beliefs rather than facts about
the world, compulsion might be thought to reveal only the external mani-
festations of beliefs and not the actual beliefs themselves. Consider, for
example, the Supreme Court's decision last term in Doe v. United
States. 5 The case arose out of the government's efforts to secure bank
records of the target of a grand jury investigation into the fraudulent ma-
nipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. Initially, the
12. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (privilege rooted in distrust
of self-deprecatory statements and need to protect the innocent); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
448-49 & n.23 (1974) (privilege protects courts from reliance on untrustworthy evidence).
13. See, e.g., Dolinko, supra note 7, at 1074-77.
14. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961):
To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be and have been to an unascertained extent,
found to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of excluding confessions that are
not voluntary does not rest on this consideration. Indeed, in many of the cases in which the
command of the Due Process Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving the
use of confessions obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence left
little doubt of the truth of what the defendant had confessed.
15. 108 S. Ct. 2341 (1988).
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grand jury subpoenaed from Doe (the target) the records of transactions
in three named banks in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Although
Doe produced some of the records, he testified that none of the additional
records were in his possession or control. The government thereupon sub-
poenaed the foreign banks for the records, but the bank refused to comply,
citing bank secrecy laws of Bermuda and the Cayman Islands that pro-
hibit disclosure of account records without the customer's consent."
Undeterred by these setbacks, the government then petitioned the dis-
trict court for an order directing Doe to sign a "consent directive" in-
structing any bank at which Doe had a bank account to disclose docu-
ments relating to the account to the grand jury. Citing his privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, Doe refused to execute the form.
He was held in contempt, and Justice Blackmun, writing for eight jus-
tices, affirmed this judgment, thereby rejecting Doe's fifth amendment
claim.
In order to follow the Court's analysis, it is first necessary to compre-
hend the basic structure of modern fifth amendment doctrine. The Court
has held that a suspect who wishes to rely on the fifth amendment privi-
lege must show that three separate factors coalesce. First, she must show
that the statement is incriminating. This means that there must be a risk
that either the statement, or fruits derived from the statement, will at
some point be introduced against the person relying on the privilege in a
criminal trial."
Second, she must show that there has been compulsion. The compulsion
can consist of a court order, such as a subpoena requiring the testimony,"8
or the threat of physical or psychological pressure, such as use of the third
degree in police interrogations, 9 or more informal pressure, such as threat
of loss of employment if the fifth amendment privilege is not waived.20
Finally, the suspect must show that the statement is "testimonial." As
16. Id. at 2343-44.
17. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (use and derivative use immu-
nity satisfies fifth amendment by insuring that testimony cannot lead to infliction of criminal penalties
on witness); Westen & Mandell, To Talk, To Balk, or To Lie: The Emerging Fifth Amendment
Doctrine of the "Preferred Response", 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 521, 524 (1982) (exclusion of incrimi-
nating statements from future criminal prosecutions satisfies fifth amendment).
One might suppose that this requirement would mean that a potential defendant could never object
to the application of compulsion against him, since the later availability of automatic or constructive
use immunity would defeat any future fifth amendment claim if the state attempted to introduce the
compelled testimony against him. But the Supreme Court has held that the state may not rely upon
constructive use immunity to justify compulsion. Rather, before it applies the compulsion, it must
formally immunize the witness in cases where there is a risk of future incrimination. See United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616 (1984). This requirement is not necessary to protect the witness,
who would be fully protected by later immunity. Rather, it is necessary to protect the state, which
might otherwise inadvertently complicate a future prosecution by the necessity of proving an indepen-
dent source for all evidence introduced against the defendant. Id.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984).
19. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-63 (1966).
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discussed in greater detail below, 2 it is not altogether clear from the
Court's cases what this requirement consists of. But for present purposes,
we can say that requirement means that the statement must require her to
employ her cognitive faculties to relate some factual assertion or disclose
information. The Court has used the requirement to hold that compelling
defendants to submit to blood tests,2 2 fingerprinting,2 3 lineups, 24 and
handwriting2 5 and voice identification procedures2 6 does not implicate fifth
amendment rights.
How should this tripartite test be applied to Doe? The test indicates
that neither Doe nor his banks would have a fifth amendment privilege to
resist production of bank records incriminating Doe that were in posses-
sion of the banks. True, Doe would be incriminated by these records, but
he would not be compelled to do anything if the subpoena were served on
the banks. The banks would be compelled, but they would not be incrimi-
nated by the records. Because the compulsion and the incrimination must
coalesce-because the same person who is compelled must also be incrimi-
nated-a subpoena on the banks would not implicate fifth amendment
rights. 2 ' Thus, the government's difficulty in enforcing the subpoena
against the banks derived from local Bermudian and Cayman Island law,
rather than from the fifth amendment privilege.
It is also probably true that even if Doe himself had possessed the bank
records, the government could have compelled him to produce them. One
might suppose that in these circumstances Doe would have a valid fifth
amendment claim because a subpoena directed to him would constitute
compulsion, and the documents the government sought were incriminat-
ing. But although a subpoena compels Doe to produce the documents, he
is not thereby compelled to create them. Thus, the documents themselves
are incriminating but not compelled. Of course, the production of the doc-
uments is compelled. But ordinarily, the mere act of production is not
incriminating. Compliance with a subpoena does implicitly testify that the
documents the government sought exist, that the suspect is in possession of
them, and that the documents produced are the documents named in the
subpoena. 8 The Court has recognized that there may be occasions when
this testimony is incriminating, such as when possession of the documents
is itself an unlawful act or when the suspect's implicit authentication of
the documents when he responds to the subpoena might be used against
21. See infra text accompanying notes 30-35.
22. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
23. Id. at 764.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967).
25. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
26. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973).
27. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973).
28. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
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him. When this is so, the suspect has a fifth amendment right to decline
production.29 But in many other cases, there is little or no prospect that
the act of production will testify to any facts that the government will use
against the suspect. In such cases, it is the documents themselves, rather
than the act of production, that are incriminating.
Even if the act of production itself is not incriminating, it might be
thought that the failure to produce is privileged because the fruits of that
act-the documents themselves-are incriminating. But such a claim
would founder on the third element of a fifth amendment violation-the
testimonial requirement. As long as the act of production does not convey
to the government "testimonial" information used to convict the accused, it
does not implicate fifth amendment rights.
It was the "testimonial" requirement that ultimately defeated Doe's
fifth amendment objection to the consent directive. Execution of the direc-
tive was surely compelled, and there can be no doubt that this compelled
execution might lead to incriminating evidence that the government other-
wise would not have been able to obtain. But the Court held that the
directive was not testimonial and that the government could therefore
force Doe to execute it.3 0
The Court's analysis of the "testimonial" component of the self-incrim-
ination clause masks a continuing confusion about the meaning of the re-
quirement and the reasons for its existence. The Court insisted that the
consent directive was not testimonial because "neither the form nor its
execution communicates any factual assertions, implicit or explicit, or con-
veys any information to the Government."'" The form did not acknowl-
edge the existence of any account in a foreign financial institution or tell
the government where to find such an account. By signing the form, Doe
made no statement-explicit or implicit-about the existence of accounts,
and his execution of the form would not admit the authenticity of any
records subsequently prepared or released by the banks.
But this formulation of what it means for a statement to be "testimo-
nial" does not quite capture the Court's prior holdings on the subject. For
example, in Schmerber v. California,3" the Court upheld compelled blood
tests for the purpose of measuring the blood alcohol of a drunk driving
suspect. There is a sense in which these compelled tests did disclose in-
criminating information about the accused-i.e., that he was drunk at the
time the test was taken. It would seem, therefore, that all three compo-
nents of a fifth amendment violation were present.
Schmerber might nonetheless be rationalized on the theory that com-
pelled submission to a blood test did not implicate any of the suspect's
29. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984).
30. 108 S. Ct. at 2350-52.
31. Id. at 2351.
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rational or cognitive faculties. True, Schmerber's blood "testified" to
something about him. But it did so without Schmerber's willing it to do
so. 33 If one reads the fifth amendment as premised on the "mind-body"
distinction and as privileging only willed acts that bring about self-de-
struction, then the result in Schmerber logically follows.
It is not obvious that this distinction can, in fact, be maintained or that
the fifth amendment privilege should be interpreted as tracking it. But for
present purposes, there is a more significant difficulty with this reading of
Schmerber: The consent directive in Doe, unlike the blood test in Schmer-
ber, did implicate the suspect's rational faculties. Schmerber could be
made to submit to the blood test against his will. Doe, in contrast, had to
decide to sign the consent directive. His decision amounted to an exercise
of his will-an exercise that was both compelled and incriminating.
Doe can be reconciled with Schmerber if one interprets the privilege as
forbidding the compelled use of cognitive faculties only in circumstances
where what is revealed is itself a product of those faculties. On this view,
neither Schmerber nor Doe had a valid fifth amendment claim because
neither was asked to share his thoughts, beliefs, or knowledge with the
government. 34 It is true that the government could secure the consent di-
rective from Doe only by compelling him to "choose" to execute it. It is
also true that the blood test in Schmerber revealed to the government in-
formation it would not otherwise have possessed. But in neither case did
the compelled conduct invade the private enclave consisting of the sus-
pect's personal mental state.35
A preference coercion theory of the privilege is helpful in explaining
why this enclave should be treated as sacrosanct. Such a theory need not
33. Justice Fortas apparently had a distinction of this sort in mind when he distinguished between
forcing a defendant to stand in a lineup and forcing him to speak certain words for identification
purposes. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 260-61 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). Compelled
participation in a lineup was permissible in his view because it did "not require the accused to take
affirmative, volitional action." In contrast, requiring a defendant to speak certain words, even for
identification purposes, was "more than passive, mute assistance" and amounted to "the kind of forced
cooperation by the accused . . . which is within the historical perimeter of the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination." Id.
34. See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
222-23 (1967).
35. This approach produces some odd results. If Doe had been compelled to tell the government
in which banks he had accounts, and the government then used this information to secure the records
from the banks, the records would apparently be inadmissible. See Curico v. United States, 354 U.S.
118 (1957) (custodian of union records cannot be forced to testify as to their location when records
would incriminate him). This result follows from the fact that Doe's statements were testimonial, and
the records are a fruit of those statements. Yet the government could apparently require Doe to get
the records himself and give them to the government so long as he was not required to tell the govern-
ment where he got them. Cf Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988) (custodian of corpo-
rate records can be compelled to produce them even though they incriminate him). This result seems
to follow from Fisher, where the court indicated that it would uphold a subpoena requiring the de-
fendant himself to produce the documents in question. Although the defendant would be required to
utilize his cognitive faculties in order to secure the documents, he would not thereby be revealing his
thoughts or beliefs to the government.
I am grateful to Steve Schulhofer for bringing this anomaly to my attention.
[Vol. 2: 149
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rest upon a mystical mind-body distinction or a natural law conception of
the appropriate limits of government power. Rather, it can be defended on
the ground that the use of compulsion to reveal a suspect's internal prefer-
ences is inherently irrational. To the extent that such an internal mental
state is legally relevant, disclosure of it cannot be compelled because the
act of compulsion destroys its internal character.
Although the Doe Court nowhere articulated this theory, the theory's
power is amply demonstrated by the Court's struggle to avoid its conse-
quences. Superficially, one might think that the consent directive did re-
veal something about Doe's internal mental state. If the directive were
read as stating that Doe in fact consented to government access to his
records, it would be testimonial in this sense. The Court recognized this
possibility, but dismissed it on the theory that the "directive explicitly in-
dicates that it was signed pursuant to a court order" and that the execu-
tion of the form therefore "sheds no light on [Doe's] actual intent or state
of mind.""6
Thus, the document, in effect, impeaches itself. The very fact that the
directive is compelled by court order means that it cannot be what it pur-
ports to be-i.e., a document reflecting Doe's actual consent. Indeed, even
in the unlikely event that Doe in fact consented to government access, a
form executed under these circumstances cannot reveal that fact to us.
The real mystery that Doe leaves unanswered is what interest the gov-
ernment could possibly have had in forcing Doe to execute a "consent
directive" that does not reflect his actual consent. The Court attempted to
avoid the question by treating the effect of the compelled "consent" as a
matter of Bermudian and Cayman Islands law not then before it.37 It was
thus unnecessary to determine what use, if any, the government could
make of the document.
But this dodge is hardly very satisfying. It is difficult to see how such a
document could possibly satisfy the policies behind Bermudian and Cay-
man Islands law. The bank secrecy requirements seem to make the actual
consent of the depositor determinative. Any other interpretation of the re-
quirements would turn them into a hypocritical charade.3"
If actual consent is required, then, as the Court itself recognized, a
compelled consent directive could not possibly satisfy that requirement.
Paradoxically, the government was victorious in Doe precisely because the
36. 108 S. Ct. at 2351.
37. Id. at 2351-52 n.16.
38. Indeed, the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands had expressly held that consent compelled by
a court order was not valid consent under the Island's confidentiality law. In re ABC, Ltd., 1984
C.I.L.R. 130. The Grand Court held that "where consent is a material element giving rise to a legal
consequence, it must be voluntarily and freely given in the exercise of an independent and uncoerced
judgment." Id. at 134-35. In an amicus brief submitted in Doe, the government of the Cayman Is-
lands stated that "Cayman banks presented with such a compelled consent remain subject to criminal
prosecution in the Cayman Islands if they disclose their customers' records to others." Brief of the
Government of the Cayman Islands as Amicus Curiae at 5, Doe (No. 86-1753).
9
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directive did not accomplish its objectives. If the directive had incorporated
Doe's actual consent, which the government almost certainly needed to
satisfy Cayman Island and Bermudian law,39 then the execution of the
directive would have been testimonial and violative of the fifth amendment
privilege.4°
In fact, the government's insistence on the Doe directive may be less
pointless than the Court's opinion makes it seem. In Part II, I will argue
that the government sometimes has an interest in taking advantage of the
legitimating force of such a document, even when the document cannot be
what it purports to be. On this argument, the function of the fifth amend-
ment is to prevent the government from creating the illusion of consent
when it cannot produce the real thing. If the argument is correct, then
perhaps the Doe Court should have upheld Doe's claim even
though-indeed, precisely because-the consent directive could not reveal
Doe's actual consent.
For present purposes, however, Doe can be taken to stand for the gen-
eral point that, at least in certain contexts, the fifth amendment states a
conceptual rather than a normative truth. The point is not that the gov-
ernment ought not to coerce statements regarding internal mental states.
Rather, the government cannot coerce such statements because the appli-
cation of coercive pressure makes them something other than statements
regarding internal mental states. Thus, the Doe Court holds that, as a
normative matter, the government was free to coerce Doe into executing
the consent directive. But by doing so, the government necessarily gave up
the possibility of discovering Doe's actual mental state."1
There are several attractive features to a theory of the fifth amendment
premised on the irrationality of the effort to coerce preferences. First, such
a theory avoids reliance on controversial and question-begging intuitions
about natural law. This argument for the privilege does not rest on inher-
ent limits on governmental power or on inalienable individual rights. In-
stead, it merely insists that exercises of coercion be justified on their own
39. See supra note 37.
40. According to Doe's attorney, following the Supreme Court's decision a hearing was arranged
before the U.S. district court, at which Doe signed the consent directive. The public record does not
reveal any action by the government attempting to enforce the directive. Telephone interview by the
author with Richard Timbie.
41. In order to forestall misunderstanding, I want to emphasize that the argument outlined here
depends upon a willingness to see preferences as belonging to us as individuals and as existing prior to
social interaction. I think that this view is attractive enough to make the argument both plausible and
interesting. But it is also profoundly problematic. If one is prepared to treat preferences as neither
autonomous nor individual, then there is nothing irrational about the effort to manipulate them. But,
as we shall see, this competing view of preferences introduces problems of its own. My hope is that
readers will be willing to accept provisionally an individualistic model of preferences so as to see how
far this model will take us in thinking about the fifth amendment privilege. After making the best
argument I can muster for the privilege on this assumption, I will relax the assumption at the end of
this essay and explore the complexities that are introduced if one holds a different view of how we
come to have preferences.
10
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terms. When coercion is a sensible means of revealing the truth and
thereby advances the state's end, there should be no obstacle to its use. It
is only when coercion is not useful-when it is not a sensible means, but
can be rationally explained only as an end in itself-that the privilege is
an obstacle to the use of government power.
Thus, a preference coercion theory of the privilege flips the usual align-
ment of consequentialist and nonconsequentialist argument. Most stan-
dard accounts of the privilege force its defenders to explain why we should
insist on a right to remain silent as a good in itself in the face of obvious
good consequences that would flow from compelled testimony. In contrast,
the approach outlined above puts the burden on opponents of the privilege
to defend coercion in circumstances where it seemingly accomplishes
nothing.
Second, a preference coercion theory helps to explain the outcome of
some cases that would otherwise be quite mysterious. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that prior to the Doe litigation, Doe had written in his personal diary
that he had no objection to government access to his bank account. As
noted above, current law might permit the government to subpoena this
diary entry and use it against Doe."2 If one treats the fifth amendment as
embodying a normative restraint on government invasions of personal pri-
vacy, this result is difficult to comprehend. The subpoena of the diary, no
less than compelled testimony as to a defendant's current preferences and
beliefs, reveals the defendant's private thoughts and desires.
From a preference coercion perspective, the distinction is more defensi-
ble. Ironically, the subpoena of the diary is permitted precisely because it
is an effective means of invading the privacy of Doe's internal thought
processes. This is so because the diary entry translates internal desires
into a material object that is not modified by the act of production. If Doe
was not compelled to make the diary entry, there is no inherent reason to
doubt the truth of his statements. He can therefore be compelled to pro-
duce the statements without distorting their content. In contrast, if the
state compels Doe to articulate present, internal preferences, the compul-
sion necessarily changes the internal character of the preferences, thereby
defeating the state's ends.
A preference coercion theory also has the advantage of putting current
fifth amendment doctrine in touch with the historical roots of the privilege
and with other important currents in constitutional thought. Historically,
the fifth amendment evolved from efforts to coerce political and religious
conformity. As Professor Levy writes:
Above all, the right was most closely linked to freedom of religion
42. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408-09 (1976). The statement in the text
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and speech. It was, in its origins, unquestionably the invention of
those who were guilty of religious crimes, like heresy, schism, and
nonconformity, and, later, of political crimes like treason, seditious
libel, and breach of parliamentary privilege-more often than not,
the offense was merely criticism of the government, its policies, or its
officers. The right was associated then with guilt for crimes of con-
science, of belief, and of association. In the broadest sense it was a
protection not of the guilty, or of the innocent, but of freedom of
expression, of political liberty, of the right to worship as one
pleased.43
It is hardly a coincidence that the privilege developed as an adjunct to
protection of religious and political liberty. The effort to control political
and religious belief founders on the same contradiction as the effort to
compel consent. Of course, to the extent that religious and political dissent
manifests itself in conduct, there is nothing inherently irrational about at-
tempts to punish, and so control, that conduct. But often, conduct is rele-
vant only because it serves as an external sign of internal disagreement.
The effort to control conduct, then, amounts to an effort to change the
internal system of beliefs that the state finds objectionable. But defenders
of a preference coercion theory would argue that such an effort is irra-
tional. Belief that something is true cannot be premised solely on the fact
that it is useful to believe that it is true. Therefore, the threat of punish-
ment cannot secure actual belief.
At its inception, then, the privilege was at least partially motivated by a
desire to prevent the state from attempting to do what, in the nature of
things, it cannot do." There is no point in coercing statements of religious
belief because statements secured under these conditions do not reflect the
desired internal state, any more than Doe's execution of a "consent direc-
tive" reflected actual consent.
A similar insight is manifest in a variety of related constitutional princi-
ples. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's famous condemnation of
compelled flag salutes by children in West Virginia State Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette." It might be thought that the flag salute is conduct
43. L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 332 (2d ed. 1986).
44. I make no claim that this was the only concern that produced the privilege. The creation of a
right against self-incrimination, like the creation of other constitutional provisions, is overdetermined.
Thus, in addition to its role in protecting religious and political freedom, the privilege
became merely one of the ways of fairly determining guilt or innocence, like trial by jury itself;
it became part of the due process of the law, a fundamental principle of the accusatorial sys-
tem. The right implied a humane or ethical standard in judging a person accused of crime,
regardless how heinous the crime or strong the evidence of his guilt. It reflected consideration
for the human personality in that respect, but it also reflected the view that society benefited
by seeking his conviction without the aid of his involuntary admissions. Forcing self-incrimina-
tion was thought not only to brutalize the system of criminal justice but to produce weak and
untrustworthy evidence.
Id.
45. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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that exists in the world and that there is no inherent contradiction in the
state's effort to coerce this conduct. And indeed, Justice Jackson's majority
opinion acknowledges that it is "not clear whether the regulation contem-
plates that pupils forego any contrary convictions of their own and become
unwilling converts to the prescribed ceremony or whether it will be ac-
ceptable if they simulate assent by words without belief and by a gesture
barren of meaning."'46
But precisely because it would otherwise be "barren of meaning," the
salute must be intended to signify actual belief. It is a "short cut from
mind to mind,""7 an outer sign of inner conviction. Because such convic-
tion cannot be coerced, the compulsory salute ends up compelling the indi-
vidual to utter "what is not in his mind."48
The Court's objection to such a ceremony is not so much that it is
wrong as that it is pointless. As Justices Black and Douglas put it in their
concurring opinion, "Words uttered under coercion are proof of loyalty to
nothing but self-interest. Love of country must spring from willing hearts
and free minds."49 Similarly, for Justice Jackson, the central difficulty
with the attempt to short-circuit this consensual process is not (or at least
not merely) a moral one. Rather, the objection rests on the "ultimate futil-
ity of such attempts to compel coherence." 5 According to Justice Jackson,
"those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves ex-
terminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only
the unanimity of the graveyard. . . . [The] First Amendment to our Con-
stitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings.5"
Since Barnette, the Supreme Court has fashioned a diverse and sub-
stantial body of constitutional law resting on closely related premises. For
example, decisions invalidating various religious and loyalty oaths,52 strik-
ing down mandatory school prayer53 and compelled speech,5' and re-
jecting anti-pornography legislation as an effort to control thought
processes55 seem to rest on a similar intuition.
Yet despite its force, there are important difficulties in fashioning a
general theory of the fifth amendment privilege from this approach. The
most fundamental difficulty is that it is not obvious that indoctrination
efforts such as those undertaken in Barnette are bound to be futile. It is
46. 319 U.S. at 633.
47. Id. at 632.
48. Id. at 634.
49. Id. at 644.
50. Id. at 641.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Bagget v. Bullett, 377 U.S. 360 (1962); Torcasso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
53. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
54. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974).




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1990
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
not clear, in other words, whether we fear that the state will fail when it
attempts to coerce a change in internal preferences, or whether constitu-
tional protection is necessary precisely because there is a risk that the state
will succeed.
In Part III, I will discuss the implications of an approach that treats
individual preferences as malleable through coercive social interaction.
First, however, it is necessary to see why there might be a special risk in
the criminal context that the state would engage even in futile efforts to
restructure preferences.
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE LEGITIMATION OF
PUNISHMENT
It may at first seem implausible that one could develop a general theory
of the fifth amendment privilege out of Doe. In many respects, the case is
unusual. In more typical cases, the government appears to be uninterested
in a defendant's internal desires and beliefs. Instead, government agents
want to use coercion in order to secure testimony about prior
events-precisely the sort of testimony that does not create the problems
outlined above.
Doe is also atypical because it involved an effort to compel the particu-
lar content of an individual's statements, rather than simply the fact of a
statement. In contrast, the privilege is often invoked to protect a defendant
from speaking at all, even when the government makes no effort to dictate
what the defendant will say.
These difficulties with a preference coercion approach are perhaps bestillustrated by the Court's jurisprudence concerning custodial police inter-
rogation. Before Miranda v. Arizona," most of the law about such inter-
rogation did not involve the fifth amendment privilege at all. For much of
this period, the fifth amendment was thought to be inapplicable to state
officers, who were responsible for many of the abusive practices that con-
cerned the Court.57 Moreover, despite scattered precedent to the con-
trary,58 it was widely assumed that the privilege did not address the kind
of informal, pretrial pressure that caused many defendants to confess in
the station house.59
Consequently, the Court attempted to develop the law of police interro-
gation out of general due process principles. In each case, the Court at-
56. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
57. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (fifth amendment privilege not applicable in
state prosecutions).
58. See Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897) (fifth amendment privilege violated in con-
text of pretrial interrogation).
59. See Developments in the Law: Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 960-61 (1966).
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tempted to determine whether the defendant's will had been overborne by
unacceptable police techniques.6
The cases that utilized this approach were unsatisfactory in a number
of respects.6 Because the Court lacked a coherent conception of free will,
it never managed to articulate a general theory that explained what made
particular police techniques unacceptable. The result was that the deci-
sions of cases tended to be ad hoc, unpredictable and apparently unprinci-
pled. They gave little guidance to lower court judges and to the police
themselves as to the acceptable bounds of police behavior.
Moreover, the approach left the rights at stake substantially under-
enforced. Institutional limitations prevented the Court from examining
more than a tiny fraction of the thousands of police interrogations that
yielded confessions. And because each case rested on its own facts, it
proved impossible to reduce the applicable legal requirements to rules that
could be bureaucratically implemented in the absence of individualized
judicial review.
Conventionally, Miranda has been understood as the Court's response
to these difficulties. Faced with the choice of underenforcement or over-
enforcement, it chose a series of bright-line, prophylactic rules that held
the promise of effectively guaranteeing the rights at stake over the range
of cases at the cost of failing accurately to capture the nuances of each
individual case to which the rules were applied.62
This tradeoff was accomplished by recharacterizing the effect of custo-
dial interrogation. Miranda's central holding was that the confluence of
custody and interrogation created an irrebuttable presumption that there
had been the kind of compulsion that triggered application of the fifth
amendment privilege.6 3 This compulsion could be dissipated only by read-
ing to the defendant the now-famous warnings concerning his right to
remain silent and to counsel. Since a defendant who confessed in the ab-
sence of warnings was necessarily compelled, his statements could not con-
stitutionally be incriminating and therefore had to be suppressed in any
ensuing criminal prosecution.
Most of the controversy surrounding Miranda has been generated by
the Court's imposition of this exclusionary rule for confessions secured in
60. For some representative examples, see Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Colombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
61. For a classic discussion, see Y. Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions 1-25 (1980)
62. For a recent defense of Miranda on these grounds, see Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic
Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190 (1988).
63. Almost a quarter century later, the legitimacy of this holding continues to spark debate. Com-
pare Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435, 446-53 (1987) (Miranda's con-
clusive presumption of compulsion was an unquestionably legitimate act of adjudication and a reason-
able reaction to the problems of the voluntariness test) with Grano, Miranda's Constitutional
Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 174, 178-86 (1988) (custodial inter-
rogation does not always lead to compulsion; the Constitution does not authorize the Court to reverse
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the absence of warnings. But this controversy has tended to obscure the
most important and troubling aspect of the decision. Miranda's exclusion-
ary rule was clearly foreshadowed by the cases that preceded it, which
had thrown substantial doubt on the use of uncounseled station house con-
fessions. 4 What was new and problematic about Miranda was not the
Court's articulation of the defendant's rights in the station house, but
rather its articulation of the way in which a defendant could give up those
rights. Miranda replaced the vague, amorphous, and fact-specific analysis
of whether a particular defendant's will had been overborne with a clear
and relatively simple procedure for the police to follow. And it offered the
police the promise that if that procedure was followed, the resulting con-
fessions would be admissible.
Thus, the Miranda Court did not hold, as some law enforcement offi-
cials feared that it would, that all uncounseled confessions were inadmissi-
ble. Although the Court rejected the view that waiver of the rights to
silence and counsel could automatically be inferred from the mere fact of
warnings followed by a confession, it clearly anticipated that confessions
would be admissible in cases where the defendant was adequately warned
and chose to waive his rights.6"
As the matter has worked out in practice, the police are more or less
guaranteed an admissible confession if they read the defendant his rights
and secure from him a statement that he understands the rights, that he
does not desire counsel, and that he wishes to make a statement. 6 Al-
though due process voluntariness arguments remain available to challenge
confessions even when Miranda waivers are obtained, most confessions
are vulnerable only in circumstances where the police fail to inform the
defendant of his rights 7 or where the defendant chooses to invoke them. 8
From the perspective of a preference coercion model of the fifth amend-
ment privilege, this resolution seems doubly perverse. When a
Mirandized suspect confesses to a crime, she makes two sorts of state-
ments. First, she indicates that she does not want counsel and wants to
64. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (confession suppressed when defendant not per-
mitted to see lawyer who wished to see him); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (surrep-
titious interrogation by police agent in absence of counsel violated sixth amendment right to counsel);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (failure to warn defendant of right to counsel contributed to
Finding that confession involuntary).
65. Although warning that "a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the
accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually
obtained," the Miranda Court held that "an express statement that the individual is willing to make
a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver."
384 U.S. at 475.
66. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (an explicit statement of waiver is
not invariably necessary to support a finding that a properly warned defendant waived Miranda
rights).
67. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
68. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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speak. Then, she recounts to the police facts about commission of the
crime.
On a preference coercion theory, the first statement should be constitu-
tionally vulnerable. Miranda proceeds on the assumption that custodial
statements made in the absence of counsel and in response to police inter-
rogation are inherently compelled. The statement "I do not want a law-
yer," made while in custody and in response to a question, is therefore
compelled and cannot, on a preference coercion theory, reveal the suspect's
actual preferences. Yet Miranda seems to allow the police to rely upon
such a statement to shield the subsequent confession from constitutional
attack.
A defender of Miranda might respond that the Miranda warnings
themselves dissipate the coercion that otherwise infects custodial interroga-
tion and therefore permit us to learn the suspect's actual preferences as
between speech and silence. Perhaps there is something to this view.
There may be some cases where it will make a real difference to an incar-
cerated suspect when he is told that he has a right to remain silent and to
the presence of counsel. But over the range of cases, the assumption that
the Miranda ritual makes an important difference is surely nayve.6 9 The
warnings inform the defendant that he has a right to the presence of coun-
sel. That right, in turn, is based on the presumption that an incarcerated
defendant who makes incriminating statements in the absence of counsel
has been compelled in the constitutional sense. But if the presumption is
correct, then it is hard to understand why any waiver secured in the ab-
sence of counsel is not similarly compelled. 0 The same implicit coercion
that would cause the suspect to speak prior to Miranda is surely likely to
cause him to execute the appropriate waivers in the post-Miranda
world.7"
69. As Professor Alschuler has written:
Apart from a handful of remorseful suspects, another handful who may seek conviction for
political or other reasons, and a third handful who are innocent and able to clear themselves by
talking, virtually no one under arrest makes a truly knowing and voluntary waiver of Mi-
randa rights. . . . Each year, courts find multitudes of intelligent waivers by suspects who,
had they understood their situations in the slightest degree, surely would have remained
silent."
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargain-
ing System, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931, 1007 (1983).
70. The comments of a prosecutor surveyed by an American Bar Association committee on the
impact of constitutional rights on crime control summarize the point:
[A] good police officer [could talk defendants into confession before or after] there was a Mi-
randa, . . . and so it had no real impact at all upon the ability of good police officers to get
confessions. [Oince you have a defendant who has either signed or else there is good evidence
that he has been advised of his rights, there is not a jury, or really a thinking judge, it seems to
me, who is going to find that there wasn't a waiver and indeed, that the confession that came
thereafter wasn't voluntary.
American Bar Association, Criminal Justice in Crisis 29-30 (1988). Other prosecutors, judges, and
police officers surveyed by the committee strongly supported this conclusion. See id. at 27-34.
71. It should therefore come as no surprise that most studies have shown no decline in the rate of
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In Part III, I will argue that this paradox is symptomatic of a broader
difficulty that lies close to the root of constitutional theory. For present
purposes, however, it is important to recognize that a preference coercion
theory also has a problem accounting for the second half of Miranda's
holding. Suppose a defendant, who is not warned or fails to waive his
rights, makes incriminating statements. Even if the defendant is thereby
compelled, as Miranda insists that he is, there is still no conceptual rea-
son why these compelled statements about facts in the world cannot be
true. Why then should they be suppressed?
Of course, there is a sense in which even a suspect's recounting of prior
events reflects no more than internal mental states. No confession can ever
constitute a transparent window on external reality. At best, the suspect is
telling us what he believes to be true rather than what is true in some
ultimate sense. It might therefore be argued that even statements concern-
ing facts in the world are, in some sense, statements about internal beliefs.
But this will not do. Although the speaker can tell us only what he
believes to be true, the government is not interested in these statements
because they reflect his internal beliefs. Rather, the statements are impor-
tant (and will be introduced against the speaker) only because they are
evidence of some external state of affairs. The situation is thus crucially
different from the case in which the suspect says that he does or does not
want a lawyer, or in which Doe says that he does or does not consent to
release of his bank records. The government should be interested in those
statements only to the extent that they accurately reflect an internal pref-
erence or belief, and not because they are evidence of some external state
of affairs.
Moreover, it is important that when Doe was required to sign the con-
sent directive, he was not simply coerced to tell us whether he consented.
The Court's order required him to state that he consented. Similarly, a
Mirandized suspect who waives his right to counsel, has, on Miranda's
own premises, been coerced into stating a particular preference- i.e., the
preference for speaking to the police in the absence of counsel. It is this
effort to make a subject have a particular preference that is irrational.
There may, of course, be instances where a suspect is similarly coerced to
make a particular statement. But Miranda protects suspects even if the
coercion amounts to no more than pressure on the suspect to make a state-
ment, without regard to its content.
A more plausible argument for a preference coercion justification for
Miranda rests on the recognition that compelled cooperation, even when
it fails to reveal the defendant's true preferences, may serve to legitimate
Custodial Interrogation in Our Nation's Capitol: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 Mich. L.
Rev. 1347 (1968). For discussions of the empirical evidence, see American Bar Association, Criminal
Justice in Crisis 27-34 (1988); Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435, 456
(1987); White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 18-21 (1986).
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levels of punishment that could not be rationally justified on an accurate
cost/benefit analysis.
In order to see why this is so, we need to return to a question left
unanswered in the previous section: if it is really true that internal prefer-
ences cannot be coerced, why would government officials be tempted to try
to accomplish the impossible? After all, the very fact that the effort to
compel internal preferences is irrational might be thought to provide a
built-in protection against the use of coercion by state officials to achieve
this end.
But although preferences cannot be compelled, conduct can be, and
compelled conduct can be made to stand for the preferences that govern-
ment officials cannot create. These superficial signs of changed prefer-
ences-as false and misleading as they may be-may nonetheless be use-
ful to the state because they shield us from the full implications of our
actions when we punish a defendant.
Punishment always involves the infliction of pain, and almost all of us
are ambivalent about the exercise of this sort of power over individuals.
We therefore want the defendant himself to acknowledge the rightness of
the punishment and the justice of what we are doing to him. If the de-
fendant himself wishes to be punished (or at least acquiesces in the pun-
ishment), then we can tell ourselves that we are not simply acting sadisti-
cally towards him, but are vindicating principles the justice of which even
the defendant acknowledges. Perhaps we are even acting for his own good.
The evidence is all around us that people use coercion in order to fool
themselves in this way. Consider, for example, the Moscow "show-trials"
of the 1930s. Stalin had at his disposal sufficient force to liquidate his
political opponents and to control all of their external behavior. But any-
one who thought that this was all that the public confessions and humilia-
tion were about missed half the point of the trials. The show trials were
atrocities precisely because Stalin's objective was not solely to eliminate
opposition, but to force the defendants to acknowledge their own guilt and
the justice of their own executions.72 Of course, this objective could never
be achieved. Stalin could coerce the outward signs of agreement and sub-
mission, but no amount of force could achieve actual consent.7 3 Yet the
futility of the exercise did not prevent the infliction of great pain in the
effort to create the illusion of achieving the unachievable.74
72. As my colleague Mark Tushnet has written:
A liberal's horror at Rubashov's degradation in Darkness at Noon rests only in part on the
judgment that imposing practical consequences of beliefs is bad, and even more on the judg-
ment that dictating belief-insisting that, no matter how one behaves, what matters is what
one believes-is much worse.
Tushnet, Religion In Politics, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1131, 1144 (1989).
73. For example, many of those who publicly confessed during the show trials continued to use
veiled language that hinted at the falsehood of what they were admitting. For an account, see N.
Leites & E. Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation: The Case of the Moscow Trials 276-336 (1954).
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Fortunately, our own country has been free of anything remotely com-
parable to Stalinist purges. But some of the same impulses are apparent
in watered-down form in our own culture. Consider, for example, the
recent public demand that President Reagan "apologize" for his approval
of the "Iran-Contra" operation and acknowledge the wrongness of his de-
cision. It is quite mysterious why we should want such an apology, or,
indeed, how a statement extracted under the threat of political reprisal
can tell us anything about whether the President was actually "sorry."
Yet the public desire for such a statement-meaningless as it inevitably
would have been-was palpable.
A similar desire regularly manifests itself in the context of criminal
prosecutions. It is most readily apparent in the ritual surrounding guilty
pleas and allocution at sentencing reenacted thousands of times each day
in courtrooms throughout the country. The only point of this ceremony is
to provide outward evidence of the compelled restructuring of internal
preferences.
Typically, the defendant has already agreed to a bargained plea of
guilty. By itself, the bargain consists of a straightforward trade whereby
the defendant gains a reduction in sentence in exchange for saving the
prosecution the process costs of a trial and the risk of an acquittal. But the
price demanded by the prosecution usually consists of more than the re-
quirement that the defendant undergo some period of incarceration. He
must first stand before the judge, listen to a summary of the evidence, and
affirm that he is freely and voluntarily waiving his right to trial and ad-
mitting his guilt.7 5 Although the Supreme Court has affirmed the consti-
tutionality of "Alford pleas" pursuant to which a defendant pleads guilty
without actually admitting his guilt,"6 many judges and prosecutors refuse
to accept such pleas.
Moreover, the implicit bargain often includes the additional require-
ment that the defendant publicly state his contrition for the criminal act.
Prosecutors and judges never expressly tell defendants that they will re-
ceive a reduced sentence if they say that they are "sorry." But criminal
defense attorneys know that expressions of remorse can lead to a more
lenient sentence and therefore regularly urge their clients to make such
statements. 7 7 Of course, this kind of implicit bargaining cannot produce
were completely unbelievable.
Even if the confession is disbelieved, a defendant who humbly confesses and admits that his
opponents were right is to some extent discredited politically-certainly more than if, publicly,
he had put up a stout fight. Even if the confession is disbelieved, it is a striking demonstration
of the power of the State over its opponents.
R. Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties 208 (1973).
75. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
76. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
77. Section 3El of the federal sentencing guidelines specifically mandates a reduction in punish-
ment for a defendant who "clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal
responsibility for the offense of conviction." There can be no doubt that this provision places pressure
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actual remorse, any more than the explicit bargaining over the guilty plea
itself can produce actual consent to the imposition of punishment. But the
very fact that the bargaining goes on-that judges and prosecutors do on
occasion grant concessions in order to secure such expres-
sions-demonstrates that actors in the system attach some importance to
these external signs of the restructuring of internal preferences and are
willing to use the coercive forces at their disposal to produce them.
On this view, then, when a government official coerces a suspect to
speak, she may be motivated by the desire to produce one of two possible
results. She may be authentically interested in the information that the
suspect can convey. If this were the state's only concern, there would be
no objection to the use of coercion in order to secure it. We know this in
part because we regularly permit the use of coercion to extract informa-
tion from non-defendants. But when the defendant is coerced, the official
may also be interested in producing the outward signs of a change in the
suspect's inner preferences. Specifically, she may wish to create the illu-
sion that the suspect has "freely" chosen to cooperate in his own destruc-
tion, thereby legitimating the punishment that the state is about to inflict.
Given the possibility of these two distinct motivations for the use of
coercion, and given the difficulty of reconstructing after the fact which
motive was determinative, a preference coercion theory might outlaw com-
pelled incrimination as a prophylactic measure designed to prevent com-
pulsion that is motivated by the desire to change the outward manifesta-
tion of preferences.
If this justification for the fifth amendment is correct, it might be
thought that coerced confessions should be admissible as long as the prose-
cutor makes clear that they were in fact coerced-that they were secured
against the defendant's will and in no sense manifested any desire by the
defendant to cooperate with the prosecution. If the nonvoluntary nature of
on defendants to acknowledge their guilt publicly. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit recently noted,
accepting responsibility for a crime entails admitting the crime, while trial strategies predicated
upon a claim of innocence entail denial of the crime. A defendant who maintains her innocence
at trial, and then purports to accept responsibility afterward, may have a difficult time per-
suading the trial judge that her later position is sincere rather than merely convenient.
United States v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Young, 875
F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1989).
Similarly, the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice permit sentencing conces-
sions when there is substantial evidence to show that "the defendant is genuinely contrite and has
shown a willingness to assume responsibility for his or her conduct." American Bar Association, Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice §14-1.8 (2d ed. 1980). Significantly, the commentary on this section recog-
nizes that in a world where defendants receive sentencing concessions for guilty pleas, such pleas will
often not reflect true contrition. But the Commentary suggests that this problem can be avoided if "the
trial court interrogate[s] the defendant carefully in order to determine whether the defendant's guilty
plea truly reflects repentance." Id. The Commentary thus requires defendants to undergo a public
display of contrition and self-abasement in order to qualify for the sentencing concession. It seems to
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the confession were clearly proclaimed-perhaps in a press release or in a
document lodged with the court-then the confession would serve only to
provide the prosecutor with information and would not contribute to the
illusion that the defendant acquiesced in her own punishment.
In fact, when the prosecutor is able to claim credibly that evidence was
obtained without any cooperation from the defendant, then the privilege is
unavailable. Thus, the Court has held that evidence seized from a defend-
ant against her will is not within the scope of the privilege. 8 Similarly,
when the defendant's conduct is clearly non-volitional-when the state
has the capacity to do something to her without her cooperation-then the
privilege is not available. This is the teaching of cases such as Schmerber
and Fisher, which treat as nontestimonial compelled submission to blood
tests or production of papers.7 9
If we had a widely accepted and coherent model for free will-the kind
of model that might grow out of a broader normative theory-it might be
possible for the state to make plausible claims that the defendant had not
acted volitionally as we moved away from these core cases. But recall that
a preference coercion theory represents an effort to make do without a
theory about the kinds of social interaction that are a necessary prerequi-
site for freedom. 80 And in the absence of a noncontroversial theory of free-
dom, whenever the defendant accedes to state encouragement or pressure,
her action in some sense amounts to an exercise of will. This decision to
cooperate in turn reflects-or, more accurately, might be treated as re-
flecting-the defendant's acquiescence in the legitimacy of her own pun-
ishment, thereby reducing the psychic costs to the rest of us of imposing
the punishment.8"
Of course, it might still be thought that this effect is vastly outweighed
by the state's authentic need for evidence that can be secured from only
the defendant's own mouth. It is precisely for this reason that defenders of
the privilege often buttress their case by rhetoric claiming that the privi-
lege only rarely deprives police of evidence that they need 82-that it sim-
78. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29, 31-35.
80. See supra text accompanying note 8.
81. I will argue below that this theory, like all constitutional theories, requires its proponent to
stand outside the theory. The argument in the text illustrates why this is so. As explained in the text,
the preference coercion theory is premised on the belief that others in society lack a coherent model of
freedom that will permit them to distinguish between willed acts of cooperation that legitimate pun-
ishment on the one hand and compelled acts that do not on the other. Yet an advocate of the prefer-
ence coercion theory must himself have a view of the kinds of interaction that are necessary for an act
to be free. This is so because the advocate must identify cases where the government has impermissi-
bly attempted to coerce the defendant into changing the outward manifestations of his preferences. For
an argument that all constitutional theories necessarily suffer from a similar defect, see infra text
accompanying note 106.
82. For example, defenders of Miranda often point to empirical studies showing that even where
confession rates have declined following implementation of the Miranda procedures, conviction rates
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ply redirects their energies away from the simple expedient of securing
the evidence from the defendant's own mouth and toward alternative
methods that do not require the defendant's cooperation.8" The implica-
tion of this rhetoric is that there is an unacceptable risk that confessions
will be utilized for the purpose of securing the outward signs of the de-
fendant's acquiescence in his own punishment rather than for the purpose
of securing otherwise unavailable information.
If this is a correct account of the motivation for attempting to coerce
preferences, it provides a reason why a prophylactic rule would be espe-
cially necessary when a defendant is forced to make self-incriminating
statements. Like the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment,84 the fifth amendment privilege serves as a means of
avoiding excessive punishments. But whereas the eighth amendment
serves this end by imposing restraints on specific sorts of punishments, the
privilege does the same work by forcing us to confront the full implica-
tions of punishment. A prophylactic rule against forced restructuring of
preference deprives us of the opportunity to hide behind the myth that
defendants who have been coerced into making self-incriminating state-
ments really want to make them and that they are thereby consenting to
their punishment. If defendants are to be punished, on this view, then the
punishment must be justified in a clear-headed fashion after accurately
calculating all of the costs and benefits.
83. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) ("our accusatory system of criminal
justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him
by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his
own mouth.")
84. When understood in this way, the fifth amendment privilege is closely allied with the cruel
and unusual punishment clause. Consider the widely shared view that the eighth amendment outlaws
corporal punishment. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (any use of strap in
Arkansas penitentiaries is cruel and therefore violates eighth amendment). On its face, the prohibition
seems difficult to justify since many defendants, if given the choice, would doubtless view such punish-
ment as much less "cruel" than years of imprisonment or death-punishments that the eighth amend-
ment has been read to permit. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty constitution-
ally permissible when imposed under system of guided discretion); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263
(1980) (mandatory life sentence for third felony conviction based on obtaining $120.75 by false pre-
tenses does not violate eighth amendment). But cf Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (life sentence
without possibility of parole for seventh nonviolent felony violates eighth amendment). Moreover,
since corporal punishment is much less expensive than incarceration for the state to inflict, there
would seem to be gains to all concerned from its use.
Yet the very ease with which corporal punishment can be inflicted also suggests a risk. Because
corporal punishment can be inflicted quickly and cheaply, there is a danger that it will be inflicted in
anger-that it will reflect a noninstrumental desire simply to hurt the defendant, rather than an effort
to use him so as to achieve the instrumental goals of deterrence and incapacitation. Thus, the inhibi-
tion against corporal punishment, like the fifth amendment privilege, can be justified as a bright-line
rule designed to protect against noninstrumental uses of the criminal justice system. See Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372-73 (1910):
With power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to give criminal character to the actions of
men, with power unlimited to fix terms of imprisonment with what accompaniments they
might, what more potent instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power? And it
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Unfortunately, once the privilege is reformulated in this fashion, its
soundness is no longer quite so uncontroversial as when it represented
merely a conceptual truth. For example, if the privilege is to be defended
as a prophylactic rule, its validity depends upon empirical facts concerning
the frequency with which government officials coerce statements in order
to create the illusion of a restructuring of preferences as compared to the
frequency with which they are motivated by the desire to secure informa-
tion. Even if we could agree on the answer to this question, a defense of
the rule would also require normative agreement as to how to trade off
the evil of one effect against the benefit of the other.
And the problems run still deeper. At best, the argument outlined above
explains why we might want to reject the government's effort to use state-
ments of fact secured in the absence of proper Miranda warnings. It fails
to explain why we should accept a suspect's statement that he wishes to
answer police questions and does not desire assistance of counsel-why, in
other words, we ought not make Miranda rights nonwaivable as long as
the defendant remains in custody without speaking to a lawyer. If custo-
dial statements concerning facts about the world are presumptively co-
erced and should be rejected under the prophylactic rule described above,
why should we accept similar statements that purport to reflect internal
preferences secured under similar circumstances?
If one believes that the function of the privilege is to prevent obfusca-
tion of the true costs of punishment, then our willingness to tolerate Mi-
randa waivers is especially troubling. As argued above, Miranda's cen-
tral importance lies not in the rights that it established, but in the new
mechanisms it provided for giving up those rights. On Miranda's own
theory, the waivers it mandates are themselves coerced, because they are a
product of inherently coercive custodial interrogation. The Miranda ritual
therefore does not serve to assure that admissible statements are "volun-
tary" or noncoerced. On the contrary, the only operative effect of the
warnings and waiver is to conceal from us the fact that the statements are
coerced. Miranda thus turns a preference coercion theory of the privilege
on its head. Instead of forcing us to confront the true cost of punishment,
the Miranda procedure creates the illusion that defendants who waive
their rights and confess after Miranda warnings have freely acknowl-
edged the legitimacy of their own destruction.
A cynic might explain Miranda on the grounds that it serves precisely
this legitimating function. This view is supported by ample empirical data
tending to demonstrate that the warnings do not in fact result in fewer
confessions by incarcerated suspects-and by the otherwise surprising
failure of a conservative, law-and-order court to overrule the decision."6
85. See supra note 71.
86. Chief Justice Burger, no friend of the Warren Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence,
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I do not want to reject this version of what Miranda is about, but I do
want to deny that it represents the whole story. Miranda can also be
understood as a product of our deep ambivalence about the individualist
premises that undergird a preference coercion theory of the privilege.
Those premises are the subject matter of the next section.
III. PREFERENCE AND COMMUNITY
The argument above has proceeded on the assumption that internal
preferences and beliefs are individualistic and that they exist prior to and
independent of social interaction. Internal preferences cannot be coerced,
on this view, because they are a reflection of an atomistic and detached
free will. There is, of course, another view of the matter. Much of modern
social science, political theory, philosophy, and literary theory attempts to
demonstrate that desires and beliefs are inevitably intersubjective and so-
cial. It is not meaningful to talk about disembodied preferences. These
mental states are always situated within a culture and molded by forces
that make various choices more or less attractive.
This final section argues that the law surrounding the fifth amendment
privilege is caught between these two conflicting models of human behav-
ior. This tension, in turn, is a manifestation of an antinomy that underlies
the broadest questions in constitutional theory.
The tension is apparent right at the surface of Miranda. On the one
hand, the opinion is the lineal descendent of a long line of earlier cases
concerning overt police coercion (torture, brutality, etc.) directed toward
criminal suspects. 87 These cases take as their starting point a suspect with
a fixed preference for silence. Although this preference is not changed by
police coercion, the coercion nonetheless forces the defendant to speak.
The defendant is thus made to do something "against his will." The po-
lice, representing the community, have invaded a private, preexisting
space that is properly under the domain of the individual.
Yet on the other hand, Miranda is importantly different from at least
the earlier cases in this series. The problem that concerned the Miranda
wrote that "The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices
have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this
late date." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring). In fact, in
some respects the modern court has extended Miranda. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)
(creating new per se exclusionary rule for confessions obtained after defendant has requested counsel
unless subsequent contact is initiated by defendant).
A recent empirical survey concludes that "[a] very strong majority of those surveyed-prosecutors,
judges, and police officers-agree that compliance with Miranda does not present serious problems
for law enforcement." American Bar Association, Criminal Justice in Crisis 28 (1988). As Professor
Schulhofer points out, "the view that Miranda posed no barrier to effective law enforcement [has]
become widely accepted, not only by academics but also by such prominent law enforcement officials
as Los Angeles District Attorney Evelle Younger and Kansas City police chief (later FBI director)
Clarence Kelly." Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435, 456 (1987).
87. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942);
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Court was not predominantly overt police brutality, which was adequately
covered by earlier due process decisions. Rather, the Court's main concern
was more subtle police techniques that did not so much overcome the de-
fendant's will as change it. The Court's lengthy excerpts from police in-
terrogation handbooks were designed to demonstrate that through artful
manipulation of the environment, the police could actually restructure the
suspect's internal preferences.88 Psychological pressure might enable the
state to harness the defendant's will for its own purposes, thereby avoiding
the necessity of overcoming his will by more primitive techniques. Thus,
the reason why custodial interrogation was inherently coercive, even in
cases where there were no outward signs of brutality or compulsion, was
because it had this potential to change what the suspect wanted, at least
for a brief period.
This second strand in Miranda grows out of the view that preferences
are not individual, autonomous, and preexisting. Instead, they are socially
constructed in the course of the very transaction that the court is asked to
review. On this view, the problem with custodial interrogation is not that
it might represent a doomed effort to restructure preferences, but that it
risked succeeding in such a restructuring.
Significantly, for the Miranda Court, the intersubjectivity of prefer-
ences was not only part of the problem, but also part of the solution.
Thus, the Court required a certain kind of social interaction between the
police and the suspect-the now-famous warning and waiver ritual-on
the theory that this interaction would itself serve to construct certain pref-
erences with regard to speech and silence. Moreover, the right to consult
with a lawyer-the right at the center of the Miranda warnings-makes
sense only as an effort to construct socially certain preferences.89
But although an intersubjective understanding of preferences is neces-
sary to make sense of Miranda, such an understanding also posed impor-
tant problems for the Miranda majority. If preferences are not autono-
mous and temporally prior to interaction, then 'there is no preexisting
state of affairs that requires protection. There is simply a choice between
different sorts of interactions that will produce different preferences. An
88. See 384 U.S. at 448-56.
89. In his dissenting opinion, Justice White argued that the Court deliberately required the type
of social interaction that would maximize the chances of the defendant remaining silent.
The obvious underpinning of the Court's decision is a deep-seated distrust of all confessions.
As the Court declares that the accused may not be interrogated without counsel present, absent
a waiver of the right to counsel, and as the Court all but admonishes the lawyer to advise the
accused to remain silent, the result adds up to a judicial judgment that evidence from the
accused should not be used against him in any way, whether compelled or not.
384 U.S. at 537 (White, J., dissenting). Perhaps this view is unfair to the Miranda majority. But
even if the majority opinion is not premised on the Justices' own preference for silence over confes-
sion, it clearly does rest on a view that "real" or "valid" preferences can only be expressed in the
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intersubjective approach thus fails to explain why we ought not man-
date-or at least permit-the type of interaction that will produce a pref-
erence for socially useful self-incrimination.
The Miranda Court avoided this critique by adopting inconsistent as-
sumptions about the nature of preferences. For some purposes, preferences
are presumed to be fixed and autonomous. That is why they are worthy
of protection. That is also why the police must pay attention to the prefer-
ence expressed in the waiver or assertion of Miranda rights. Yet for other
purposes, they are presumed to be contextual and interactive. That is why
it is important for the suspect to listen to the warnings and have the op-
portunity for interaction with a lawyer before he makes his preferences
known.
This ambivalence about the nature of preferences extends beyond the
problem of custodial interrogation. It was built into the privilege from the
beginning. As already noted, the privilege grew out of efforts to protect
the rights of religious and political dissenters.90 These dissenters were not
(or at least not simply) exercising individual rights. The individuals pro-
tected were members of religious and political communities, and their
nonconformist views were molded by this community experience. At its
inception, then, the privilege seemed to recognize that preferences were
social. Indeed, it was precisely because an individual's identity was closely
linked to a collective experience that nonconforming groups were worthy
of protection.
Modern fifth amendment law has reversed this initial understanding.
Today, individuals are often deemed to have waived their fifth amendment
privilege if they engage in group activity.9 Although the origins and scope
of this limitation on the privilege are somewhat obscure,92 it seems to
grow out of the view that the preferences protected by the privilege are
individual and autonomous-that they exist independently of collective ac-
tivity.93 This is so because individual preferences and beliefs are tempo-
90. See supra text accompanying note 43.
91. See, e.g, Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
92. Originally, the rule was applied to corporations and was premised on the reserved visitorial
powers of the state over entities that had no right to exist without state permission. See Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). But this rationale has
not survived the Court's extension of the rule to unincorporated associations that do not exist at the
pleasure of the state. See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (labor unions); Bellis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (partnerships).
93. Thus, the Court's more recent articulations of the rule have emphasized the loss of personal
privacy that comes with collective activity. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 93-94
(1974):
Some of the most powerful private institutions in the Nation are conducted in partnership
form. Wall Street law firms and stock brokerage firms provide significant examples. These are
often large, impersonal, highly structured enterprises of essentially perpetual duration. The
personal interest of any individual partner in the financial records of a firm of this scope is
obviously highly attenuated.
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rally prior to group activity. They are what individuals bring to the
group, rather than what the group creates. It follows from this view that a
privilege for individual preferences adequately safeguards autonomy and
that group expressions of preference are not worthy of protection.
This reversal would be interesting even if the modern view were simply
a perversion of the original understanding of the privilege. But it is not
simply a perversion. The individualist conception of the privilege was also
present from the outset and coexisted uneasily with the contrary commu-
nal view. Torture and inquisitorial techniques were objectionable pre-
cisely because they overrode individual conscience. State prosecution of
dissenters was dangerous because it threatened to swamp the individual
and to treat him as no more than a tool for the advancement of the collec-
tive good. The normative attractiveness of the privilege thus rested cru-
cially on the autonomy of preferences. Without such a view, it is hard to
generate an argument for why the state should be deprived of the ability
to mold preferences in a fashion that is utility-maximizing.
It seems plausible, then, that the confusion and controversy surrounding
the privilege derives, in some measure, from our ambivalence about com-
peting individualist and group models for the formation of preferences.
Moreover, this antinomy is not a peculiar characteristic of fifth amend-
ment doctrine. It would not overstate matters to say that it is a defining
characteristic of modern constitutional law.
For example, the current debate between advocates of pluralist and
neo-republican theories of the Constitution can be conceptualized in these
terms. Pluralists tend to treat preferences as individual and autonomous.
For them, the political system simply measures and aggregates these pref-
erences, and the purpose of the Constitution is to insure that they are
measured and aggregated fairly and accurately. 4
Neo-republicans, in contrast, see preferences as growing out of a collec-
tive experience. For them, politics involves the formation of preferences,
rather than simply their measurement. Thus, the Constitution is not auto-
matically satisfied when the government reflects the desires that people
bring to political decisions. Rather, the Constitution guarantees a deliber-
ative process with transformative potential. People can be put in a setting
where their preferences will change, and the purpose of the Constitution
is to create a context in which they will change for the better."
collective group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights and duties nor to be entitled to
their purely personal privileges"). Somewhat anomalously, the Court nonetheless continues to apply
the rule automatically to corporate entities even in cases where a single individual is the sole share-
holder of the corporation. See Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988).
94. For a discussion, see Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a
Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1006, 1013 n.31 and sources
cited therein.
95. For representative examples of the growing body of literature of this sort, see Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689; Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985); Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L.
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The Supreme Court's treatment of equal protection arguments in
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz9 and City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center97 illustrate these contrasting approaches. In
Fritz, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the manner in which
Congress restructured the railroad retirement system. Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion proceeds from pluralist premises. Thus the Court rejects
the effort to impose some normative standard of equity on the division of
the limited funds available for the retirement system. Rather,
the plain language of [the statute] marks the beginning and end of
our inquiry. There Congress determined that some of those who in
the past received full windfall benefits would not continue to do so.
Because Congress could have eliminated windfall benefits for all
classes of employees, it is not constitutionally impermissible for Con-
gress to have drawn lines between groups of employees for the pur-
pose of phasing out those benefits.98
This skepticism about the possibility of an external, normative standard of
equity is closely related to the view that politics involves no more than the
measurement of preexisting, individual preferences. It was thus irrelevant
that the Congress which had enacted the challenged statute engaged in no
actual deliberation about it and, indeed, was apparently unaware of what
it was doing.
[W]e disagree with the District Court's conclusion that Congress
• . . was misled by the groups that appeared before it. If this test
were applied literally to every member of any legislature that ever
voted on a law, there would be very few laws which would survive
it. The language of the statute is clear, and we have historically as-
sumed that Congress intended what it enacted. To be sure, appellees
lost a political battle in which they had a strong interest, but this is
neither the first nor the last time that such a result will occur in the
legislative forum.99
The Fritz Court's tautological assertion that the scope of constitutional
review is dictated by the very congressional decision under review con-
trasts sharply with the more activist stance in Cleburne. The Cleburne
court invalidated a zoning ordinance that prevented the erection of a
group home for the mentally retarded in a residential neighborhood. This
conclusion was markedly influenced by a neo-republican conception of
politics. Significantly, there was no indication in Justice White's majority
Rev. 4 (1986). See generally Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988).
96. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
97. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
98. 449 U.S. at 176-77.
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opinion that the Cleburne City Council had inaccurately measured and
aggregated the preferences that individuals brought to the zoning process.
Instead, the problem was that these individual preferences themselves
were normatively unacceptable.
[Miere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which
are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible
bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from
apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like. It is plain that
the electorate as a whole [could] not order city action violative of the
Equal Protection Clause, and the City may not avoid the strictures
of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fac-
tion of the body politic.1 00
The Cleburne Court thus envisioned judicial review as something more
than a guarantee that preexisting preferences are adequately reflected in
political decisions. Judicial review was also a mechanism for changing
those attitudes-for insuring, in Justice White's phrase, that they do not
rest on- "irrational prejudice." In this sense, Justice White's opinion is
part of a tradition that includes Earl Warren's majority opinion in Brown
v. Board of Education 1 and Louis Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v.
California 1 0-a tradition that stands in stark contrast to that represented
by Barnette. Decisions like Brown and Cleburne treat preferences as dy-
namic rather than static and interactive rather than individualistic. More-
over, they treat government as having an important role in establishing
the proper context in which the right sort of preferences will emerge.
Thus, compelled racial integration is justified because the compulsion will
produce a new context out of which the "correct" preferences will
emerge. 0 3 Similarly, for Justice Brandeis it was important for courts to
foster free debate about public issues in part because such debate would in
turn educate an involved populace in the duties of citizenship.
It is not enough, however, to see that Fritz and Cleburne reflect contra-
dictory conceptions of politics and that these conceptions are related to
different models of preference formation. The cases also demonstrate that
pluralist and neo-republican conceptions, although contradictory, are also
parasitic on each other. Thus, the Cleburne court's analysis seems to re-
ject the view that individual preferences are fixed and exogenous to the
analysis. That is Why they are subject to normative criticism. Yet the
Cleburne City Council's preferences regarding the mentally retarded are
normatively unacceptable precisely because they violate the tenets of indi-
100. 473 U.S. at 448.
101. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
102. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927).
103. For a discussion, see Gewirtz, Choice in Transition: School Desegregation and the Correc-
tive Ideal, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 728 (1986).
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vidualism. The "irrational prejudice" that motivated the invalid ordinance
amounted to an unwillingness to treat as autonomous and equal the indi-
vidual desires of people suffering from mental retardation.
Conversely, the Fritz Court's unwillingness to engage in normative crit-
icism of the preferences that individuals bring to the political process itself
masked a normative preference for a particular political process. The
Fritz plaintiffs argued that our political process included an activist court
imposing normative standards on the distribution of retirement benefits.
The Court's rejection of this version of the process in favor of a version in
which Congress has the last word must reflect some view about the best
context in which preferences are to be formed and expressed.1"'
It turns out, then, that the argument between pluralists and neo-repub-
licans does not neatly track the dispute about the nature of preference
formation. There is a sense in which both pluralists and republicans ad-
here to both the individualist and communal model.1 5 Indeed, my final
claim is that conflicting assumptions about the nature of preferences are
built into virtually any theory for thinking about constitutional law.
To see why this is so, imagine the position of the framers of a constitu-
tional document. On the one hand, the impetus to write a constitution
usually comes from some sort of theory that treats preferences as situated
and context-dependent. The reason for preferring one constitution over
another-the reason for caring about constitutional law-typically rests
on a prediction about the kinds of preferences that will gain expression in
one system as opposed to another coupled with a normative judgment
about the desirability of giving those preferences expression. For example,
the Federalists and Anti-Federalists who argued over the United States
Constitution were divided about which system of government would best
safeguard civic virtue and ward off the corrosive influence of faction. They
were largely united in their judgment about the desirability of promoting
civic virtue and avoiding factional strife.
Yet the framers themselves must also stand outside the theory that they
are advocating. They must view their own preferences as fixed and auton-
omous. If they were not-if the framers saw these preferences as simply
the product of the context in which they happened to work-there would
be no reason to care about them.'0 6
Thus, the Federalists and Anti-Federalists argued about whether the
new Constitution would produce a context that was conducive to the polit-
ical outcomes that they viewed as normatively attractive. Yet both sides
104. For a more extended discussion of this point, see Wasserstrom & Seidman, The Fourth
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19, 70, 103-05 (1988).
105. For example, Justice Rehnquist, who authored the'i ajority opinion in Fritz, also joined
Justice White's majority opinion in Cleburne. Justice White, in turn, joined Justice Rehnquist's Fritz
opinion.
106. For a similar argument in the context of public choice theories of constitutionalism, see




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1990
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
seemed to view their own opposing arguments as independent of context.
If they were to concede that these arguments were instead simply the by-
product of the way in which the constitutional convention happened to be
structured-that they would have a different set of preferences had the
group experience been differently structured-then they would be denying
that their own arguments had the normative force that they wished to
attribute to them.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fifth amendment privilege poses a puzzle we are unlikely to solve.
This is so because it is part of a larger enigma. We live our lives as if our
own preferences were autonomous and belonged to us as individuals. Yet,
all the while believing this, we also somehow manage to glimpse the real-
ity that our preferences are situated and intersubjective. When we see the
world in the first way, we can also see that government coercion designed
to change preferences can succeed only in changing the outward manifes-
tation of those preferences. When we see it in the second, we see the pos-
sibility that government might in fact mold our preferences and that we
would be collectively better off for the change.
Our evaluation of the privilege is caught between these two intuitions.
The privilege forms a part of a perspective that allows us to act upon our
beliefs. Our rejection of it forms part of a perspective that allows us to
transcend those beliefs so as to make critical judgments about our actions.
Unless we are to give up our ability to act, or our ability to think about
how we act, we are bound to remain irresolute.
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